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Who Let the Dogs Out?
Tracking the Philosophical Life among the 
Wolves and Dogs of the Republic
Christopher P. Long
The wolf exerts a powerful influence on the human imagination. It takes your 
stare and turns it back on you.
—Barry Lopez, Of Wolves and Men
Philosophies diffuse odors.
—George Santayana, Dialogues in Limbo
The Complex olfaCtory communication practices of wolf scent-marking 
remain in many ways a mystery to us. But for the wolves themselves, who make 
or inspect a scent mark once every two minutes, olfactory communication must 
play a rather important role in their relations with one another and the wider 
world they inhabit.1 Although scent-marking in wolves is thought to be in part 
an attempt to warn off intruders, some research suggests that it is used as a kind 
of “cognitive map” for members of the pack to find their way through the home 
territory by locating sources of water and standard hunting trails.2 Of course, 
for the breed of philosophers who seek meaningful pathways through the terri-
tory of our most ancient and familiar textual homes, the eyes, ears, and even the 
sense of taste have long been faithful guides, while the nose has remained always 
ancillary.3 Perhaps it is a species problem, for as Aristotle notes in the De Anima 
with respect to smell, “we do not have precision in this power of perceiving, but 
are inferior to many animals.”4 And yet, the wolves, and their more domesticated 
descendants, the dogs, may be onto something.5
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In his rich and engaging Dialogues in Limbo, George Santayana imagines 
himself entering into conversation with immortal dead philosophical figures, the 
first of whom, Democritus, insists that “a philosophy can be smelt.”6 In discus-
sion with Alcibiades, Democritus claims: “Hence, though it be a delicate matter 
and not accomplished without training, it is possible for a practiced nose to dis-
tinguish the precise quality of a philosopher by his peculiar odor, just as a hound 
by the mere scent can tell a fox from a boar.”7 However comical, Santayana’s 
Democritus, like our wolves and dogs, may be on to something. Perhaps the nose 
knows something of philosophy, if only we would attend to it as we navigate the 
territory of our most familiar textual homes. There is arguably no home more fa-
miliar and no text more odiferous than Plato’s Republic. So perhaps something of 
Plato’s quality as a philosopher and of Socrates’s attempt in the dialogue to sniff 
out the longer road toward a philosophical life may be discerned by tracking the 
scent of wolves and dogs in the Republic.8
Despite its rather peculiar absence of any thematization of smell or smelling 
as a mode of perceiving, Plato’s Republic reeks of various animals, but the smell of 
wolves and dogs permeates the text with striking pungency. The scent-markings 
of the canines in the Republic leave a trail that might itself be used as a kind of 
cognitive map leading us to one of the central teachings of the text itself: that the 
philosophical life is situated precariously between the tyrannical tendencies of 
the wolf and the blind obedience of the well-trained dog.
The Scent of the Wolf
The first hint of the presence of wolves in the Republic can be discerned even 
before one attacks Socrates in the form of the “wild beast” that is Thrasymachus. 
Autolykos, Odysseus’s cunning maternal grandfather, appears at a turning point 
of the discussion Socrates has with Polemarchus about the nature of justice.9 The 
appearance of Autolykos, the “lone wolf,” marks the moment when Polemarchus, 
having so eagerly taken up the question of justice inherited from his father, 
Cephalus, begins to wonder if he himself understands what he meant when he 
insisted that “justice is helping friends and harming enemies” (334a–b). Socrates 
brings him to this recognition by insisting that Autolykos would be the embodi-
ment of justice on the account Polemarchus had been defending. Citing Homer, 
Socrates emphasizes that Autolykos is said “to excel all human-beings in steal-
ing and swearing oaths” (334b).10 The appeal to Autolykos has a strong effect on 
Polemarchus, for he would rather relinquish his previous position than endorse a 
conception of justice that would elevate the “wolf itself” as a paragon. In Homer, 
Autolykos is said to have learned his skills of lying and thievery from Hermes, the 
trickster god, so well versed in using verbal equivocation to gain advantage. His 
name, Autolykos, the “lone wolf” or the “wolf itself,” like the name he gave Od-
ysseus, is rife with significance. Homer tells us that Autolykos named Odysseus 
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after his own nature; since he himself was hated (ὀδυσσάμενος) by many men 
and women throughout the land, his grandson should have the name Odysseus.11
This hatred is one side of the rather equivocal attitude the Greek mythical 
tradition has toward the figure of the wolf. On the one hand, the wolf, as Richard 
Buxton suggests, “stands for one who by his behavior has set himself beyond 
humanity.”12 This is particularly true of the “lone wolf,” a figure isolated from hu-
man and lupine community alike. Connected to this, of course, is the idea, em-
bodied by Odysseus’s grandfather, of cunning criminality. In Pythian 2, Pindar 
emphasizes this cunning in a passage that resonates deeply with the conception 
of justice for which Polemarchus advocates: “May I love my friend; but against 
my enemy I shall make a secret attack, like a wolf, treading now here now there 
on my crooked paths.”13 This dimension of the lupine character is what drives 
Polemarchus to recognize the limits of his own position. On the other hand, 
however, because of its cooperative nature, its social life together with others in 
a pack, and its practices of collaborative hunting and of the equitable sharing 
of quarry, the wolf also stood in the Greek mythological tradition as a symbol 
of community and even as an analogue for human social life.14 This strand of 
the tradition finds further expression in the treatment of domesticated dogs; and 
Socrates himself draws upon it during his discussion of the second wave in Re-
public 5 when he suggests that the guardians, men and women alike, should share 
all pursuits in common, “like dogs” (466d).15
These two dimensions of the wolf, its connection with the early phases of 
domesticated civilization and its recalcitrant segregation from communal life, 
can be discerned in the very ancient story of Lycaon in Arcadia. Lycaon’s father, 
Pelasgus, was said to be the first to settle the land, building shelter and clothing 
the people in sheepskins. These civilizing efforts were continued by Lycaon, who 
founded a city and established games in honor of Zeus. “But,” as Pausanias re-
ports, “Lycaon brought a human baby to the altar of Lycaean Zeus, and sacrificed 
it, pouring out its blood upon the altar, and according to legend immediately 
after the sacrifice he was changed from a man to a wolf [λύκον].”16 Civilization 
is not established without cost; and although the figure of the wolf here appears 
only at the moment of exile, a hint of its civilizing effect can be discerned already 
in the sheepskins Pelasgus used to clothe his people against the cold.17
If the wolf signifies the emergence and possible dissolution of community 
in the logic of Greek mythology, then it is perhaps no surprise that the scent of 
Autolykos marks the moment Polemarchus recognizes the limitations of his own 
understanding of justice and agrees ultimately to join Socrates “to do battle then 
as partners” (Republic 335e).18 We might, then, discern something sweet in the 
scent left by this first mark of the wolf in the Republic; yet something more mal-
odorous remains, for the final mark of the wolf in the Republic is found in Book 
8, when Socrates appeals to the story of Lycaon to articulate the manner in which 
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the just leader metabolizes into the tyrant (565d). The wolf then marks the mo-
ment of the emergence of the possibility of community in Book 1 and a decisive 
point in its dissolution in Book 8; between these markings of the wolf, however, 
the scent of its more domesticated cousin, the dog, emerges as dominant. Fol-
lowing the canine scent that permeates the text between the first and last appear-
ances of the wolf will put us on the trail of the philosopher and the just life that 
is possible when a desire for the Good is cultivated in an excellent soul set upon 
the trail of dialectic.
A Whiff of the Dog, the Savagery of the Wolf
The first appearance of the dog in the Republic points in this direction. Its dis-
tinct scent marks the first appearance of aretē—excellence or virtue—in the dia-
logue, although the smell of horses is also in the air. Socrates first touches upon 
the question of excellence by appealing to the virtue of dogs (335b). At the end of 
his discussion with Polemarchus, having convinced him that “it is just to do good 
to a friend, if the friend is good, and harm to an enemy, if bad,” Socrates turns his 
attention to the impact unjust actions have on other living things. Here he solicits 
agreement from Polemarchus that when a horse is harmed, it is made worse, not 
better. Socrates then asks Polemarchus if harming a horse makes it worse “with 
respect to the virtue of dogs or to that of horses” (335b). In agreeing that what it 
means to be an excellent dog is different from what it means to be an excellent 
horse or human being, and that harming and doing good to each can ruin or cul-
tivate the virtue of each, Polemarchus is led ultimately to the conclusion that “it is 
never just to harm anyone” (335e). This preliminary conclusion about the nature 
of justice is the basis upon which Socrates and Polemarchus agree “to do battle 
as partners” against those who claim otherwise; and sure enough, it is also the 
moment when they are attacked by Thrasymachus, a wolf among those gathered.
Although Socrates does not explicitly call Thrasymachus a wolf, he says that 
as they were talking Thrasymachus was “restrained by the men sitting near him” 
and then, “hunched up like a wild beast [θηρίον], he came at us as if to tear us to 
pieces” (336b). That Socrates has a wolf in mind, however, is made clear when, af-
ter Thrasymachus attacks him for speaking nonsense, he says: “I was thoroughly 
amazed hearing these things and, seeing him, I was terrified; and it seemed to me 
that if I had not seen him before he’d seen me, I would have become voiceless. But 
as it was, just when he first was made savage [ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι] by the argument, 
I looked at him first, so that I was able to answer” (336d–e). This seems to be the 
first articulation in literature of the ancient proverbial belief that being seen first 
by a wolf renders a person speechless.19 It is perhaps not unreasonable to think 
that the first appearance of the “lone wolf” in the argument with Polemarchus 
was what set Thrasymachus back on his haunches. Socrates would perhaps have 
noticed then that Thrasymachus was being “made savage” just as Polemarchus 
was being tamed. Indeed, the stance Thrasymachus takes—that justice is the ad-
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vantage of the stronger—is itself simply a more extreme and savage stance than 
the position Polemarchus defended and then relinquished (338c). Thrasymachus’s 
harsh position dovetails with his harsh disposition, which becomes yet more sav-
age the closer Socrates comes to establishing among those gathered a community 
oriented by a concern for the question of justice. This vacillation between the 
savage and the tame, the wild and the domesticated, is a trope running through 
the entire dialogue, though it is most poignant here in Socrates’s encounter with 
Thrasymachus. It is no surprise, then, to catch the scent of tyranny in the things 
Thrasymachus says, and to find the distinction between tyranny and democracy 
emerging as a central concern of a discussion that increasingly focuses on the 
question of just rule and the nature of the just human being.20 Thus the entire 
question of the nature of a just ruler and, by extension, of what it is to embody the 
excellence of justice emerges in an atmosphere thick with the savage scent of the 
wolf, even if it is also already marked by the virtue of the more domesticated dog.
Thrasymachus himself seems particularly resistant to domestication 
throughout the dialogue, though this initial encounter is a powerful demonstra-
tion of Socrates’s ability to tame the wolf.21 Although his resistance has already 
been suggested by the vicious response Thrasymachus has to the emerging com-
munity between Socrates and Polemarchus, it is reinforced again when, just as 
Socrates has those gathered convinced that the good ruler cares about the ad-
vantage of the ruled, Thrasymachus lashes out again in a particularly demeaning 
manner, asking Socrates if he has a wet nurse and insisting that his nose needs a 
wiping because he does not recognize the dynamics of the relationship between 
sheep and shepherd (334a). Here Thrasymachus draws on a long tradition, one 
heard already in Homer’s standard epithet for Agamemnon as “shepherd of the 
people,” which identifies political leadership with shepherding.22 The analogy is 
introduced, however, in order to argue that tyranny, “the most perfect injustice,” 
makes one the happiest (344a). Immediately upon articulating this position, 
Thrasymachus sought to leave, but, as Socrates reports, “he was forced to remain 
by those present” (344d). With Thrasymachus so restrained, Socrates identifies 
the central concern of the entire dialogue, which is not really justice per se but 
rather “the course of a whole life, on the basis of which each of us would live a 
most profitable [λυσιτελεστάτην] life” (344e). By putting it in terms of profitabil-
ity here, Socrates intends to shift the very meaning of what is valuable. If Thra-
symachus understands justice and the good life it enables in terms of the self-
interest of the stronger, Socrates will lead those gathered at the home of Cephalus 
to recognize as most profitable and stronger the life of justice and virtue. Thus, 
already in the first book, Socrates confronts Glaucon with the central choice of 
the dialogue: Thrasymachus “‘claims that the life of the unjust person is stronger 
than that of the just person. Which do you choose, Glaucon,’ I said, ‘and which of 
the two things said seems to you to be truer?’” To this Glaucon replied: “I, indeed, 
say that the life of the just person is the more profitable [λυσιτελέστερον]” (347e).
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The question is directed to Glaucon, who emerges in the middle of the dis-
cussion with Thrasymachus to become the central figure of the dialogue. Glaucon 
is the one with whom the main teachings of the dialogue find articulation and the 
one toward whom Socrates directs his most poignant questions. The community 
Socrates establishes with Glaucon in the Republic is the only city founded in deed 
rather than merely in speech.23 Here, in fact, is the moment when Socrates ap-
peals to the image of jurors in a court of law, and it is Glaucon who agrees that 
it will be best if they proceed as judges and speakers both (348b).24 On the basis 
of this procedure, Socrates seeks to found a community animated by a concern 
for justice among those gathered. But before that community can be established, 
Thrasymachus has to be tamed by being shown the dysfunctional nature of injus-
tice and tyrannical rule. This Socrates does in part by appealing to the training of 
animals, and specifically horses, to illustrate first, that each being has a particular 
work [ἔργον] proper to it in which it can excel and second, that the proper work 
of human being is to live well. Such a life, however, requires an orientation toward 
justice (352d–354a).25
The smell of horses here draws our attention back to the argument with 
Polemarchus and the possible community that emerged there. Indeed, these pas-
sages are braided tightly into that discussion with Polemarchus in three discern-
ible strands. First, there is a structural parallel between the shifting positions of 
Polemarchus and Thrasymachus: the former moves from his original position 
that justice is harming enemies and benefiting friends to the view that “it is never 
just to harm anyone,” while the latter moves from the claim that justice is “the 
advantage of the stronger” toward the begrudging recognition that justice is a 
certain way of life.26 Second, an appeal to animal training generally and to the 
training of horses in particular punctuates Socrates’s introduction of the ques-
tion of virtue with Polemarchus and his introduction of the proper work of a 
being in his discussion with Thrasymachus (352d). Finally, if the virulence of the 
wolf is provoked the moment Socrates appeals to Autolykos and begins to estab-
lish a philosophical friendship with Polemarchus, by the end of Socrates’s discus-
sion with Thrasymachus the wolf himself has ultimately “grown gentle [πρᾶος 
ἐγένου]” and has “ceased being hard [χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω]” (354a).
With these words—πρᾶος and χαλεπός, gentle and hard—the pungent scent 
of the wolf disperses, giving way to the discernable smell of the dog. The words 
themselves point to what is perhaps the most famous reference to dogs in the Re-
public, the moment when Socrates compares the guardians of his more luxurious 
city in speech to “noble puppies.” There he goes so far as to suggest to Glaucon 
that such dogs are “truly philosophic” (375e, 376b). Let us follow the scent.
Philosopher Dogs and Kings
Like a dog with a stick, Socrates plays with words. Having turned Glaucon’s at-
tention to the unhealthy, “feverish” city, Socrates insists that there will be a need 
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for guardians who will be fierce to enemies and yet gentle to citizens. He puts it 
this way: “Don’t you think . . . that for guarding [εἰς φυλακὴν] there is any differ-
ence between the nature of a noble puppy [γενναίου σκύλακος] and that of a well-
bred young man?” (375a). The words put Glaucon—and us—on alert: this anal-
ogy is playful; but as with all Socratic playfulness, something important is at play.
What Socrates says here with respect to the analogy between dogs and boys 
points at once back to his discussion with Polemarchus and Thrasymachus and 
forward to his account of the philosopher king. Linguistically, Socrates situates 
the nature of the dog and thus of its analogue, the guardian, between gentleness 
and savagery. In this way, he gestures back to the appearance of Thrasymachus, 
now tamed. The language is striking. Socrates asks Glaucon about the spirited 
nature of dogs, wondering “how will they not be savage [ἄγριοι] with one another 
and the other citizens?” And he continues: “But, indeed, it is necessary for them 
to be gentle [πράους] toward their own but hard [χαλεπούς] on their enemies” 
(375b–c). The words recall the position Polemarchus originally defended, namely, 
that “justice is helping friends and harming enemies,” and they echo those that 
mark the taming of the wolf at the end of Book 1 (334a–b, 354a). Thrasymachus, 
who first appeared having been “made savage”—ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι—by the discus-
sion with Polemarchus, is ultimately “made gentle” by the words Socrates speaks. 
The entire encounter with Thrasymachus is thus woven deeply into the texture of 
this passage about guardians and dogs.
If, however, the bark of the wolf can still be heard among the guardian dogs, 
we catch here too the first scent of the philosopher. Socrates evokes the “image 
[εἰκών]” of the noble dog in order to suggest that there are, in nature, animals 
who are at once gentle and great-spirited, but he goes on to insist that a guardian 
will, like a noble dog, “need, in addition to spiritedness [θυμοειδεῖ], also to be a 
philosopher [φιλόσοφος] according to nature” (375c–e). This marks the first ap-
pearance of the word φιλόσοφος in the dialogue.27 The analogy is further fleshed 
out by the suggestion that both the philosopher and the dog “distinguish friendly 
from hostile looks by nothing other than by having learned the one and by be-
ing ignorant of the other” (376b). Here again the passage is Janus-faced, pointing 
back to Polemarchus’s original articulation of justice and forward to the laughable 
suggestion in Book 5 that unless philosophers rule like kings, the city they have 
founded in speech will never “come forth by nature” (473e).28 The scent of the no-
ble dog, embodying at once the opposing characteristics of moderate gentleness 
and spirited ferocity, marks the site at which the connection between spiritedness 
and philosophy is first introduced into the dialogue. This scent-marking points 
already to the discussion of the philosopher king in Book 5, and, even beyond it, 
to the “longer road” that leads to the heart of Socrates’s teaching about the power 
of dialectic and the philosophical life animated by a desire for wisdom.29
The appeal to noble puppies here in Book 2 points more immediately, how-
ever, to the question of the proper education of the guardians; although in their 
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natures they are “philosophic, spirited, swift and strong,” they must nevertheless 
be “reared and educated” in order to become gentle to their own and fierce to 
their enemies (376c).30 In Book 3, we encounter a series of markers leading to the 
heart of Socrates’s proposed education for the guardians; but the further we fol-
low, the more the education of humans is reduced to the training of dogs, with 
the virtue of moderation emerging as primary. Music, in this context, becomes 
central to the proposed training, for music is capable of cultivating moderation 
in the soul.31 The scent of the “wild beast [θηρίον]” that is Thrasymachus reas-
serts itself in this context; for Socrates insists that a person who is “not trained 
[τρεφόμενον] and whose abilities to perceive are not purified” is the sort of 
person who “becomes a misologist and unmusical. For he no longer uses per-
suasion through words, but brings things about through force and savageness 
[ἀγριότητι], like a wild beast [θηρίον], and he lives in ignorance and awkwardly 
without rhythm and grace” (411d–e). A terrifying picture of this awkward life 
without rhythm was presented in the encounter with Thrasymachus, when he 
appeared to threaten the community that was emerging between Socrates and 
Polemarchus. In that context, Thrasymachus himself introduced the traditional 
image of the shepherd and sheep to characterize the proper relationship between 
a ruler and the ruled. Here, however, that image reappears, but Socrates has now 
shifted the focus to the proper training of dogs to protect the flock: “For indeed, 
the most terrible and shameful thing of all is for a shepherd to train [τρέφειν] 
dogs as assistants with the result that by intemperance or hunger or some other 
bad habit, the dogs themselves attempt to do harm to the sheep and instead of 
dogs become like wolves.”32 The language of “training” is here amplified and the 
concern that the guardians not become “like wolves” made explicit.
Socrates develops this image yet further at the end of Book 4 as he introduces 
the spirited dimension of the soul between the logistical aspect and the part with-
out logos.33 There the tripartite soul is thought not in terms of the metaphor of 
shepherd and sheep but in terms of the relationship between the shepherd and 
his well-trained dogs. Socrates appeals to this image to illustrate how a just per-
son will endure injustice. Such a person, when treated unjustly, will doggedly 
continue to attempt to do noble deeds, “having been called by the words in him 
like [a dog] called by a herdsman” (440d). Glaucon grasps the image immediately 
and makes it explicit: “we posited the guardians in our city like dogs obedient to 
the rulers, who are like the shepherds of the city” (440d). The imagery here of the 
guardians trained like dogs anticipates the bestiary that is Book 5 of the Repub-
lic.34 The scent of the dog thus leads us directly into Book 5, where it mingles with 
all three of the waves Socrates identifies as crashing down upon him.35
Playing in the Waves
If, as we have discerned, wolves have long stood as an analogue for the more co-
operative dimensions of human life, even as they also often signify isolation and 
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the breakdown of community, the scent of dogs that marks the first two waves 
Socrates encounters in Book 5 punctuates the more cooperative aspects of their 
character. Socrates introduces the first wave—that the male and female guardians 
should share all pursuits in common—by appealing explicitly to the behavior of 
dogs (451c–e). Female and male dogs guard the same things, they hunt together, 
indeed do “everything in common [κοινῇ πάντα]” (451e). As a result, according to 
Socrates, they must be given “the same rearing and education [τὴν τροφήν τε καὶ 
παιδείαν]” (451e). Here, where education is reduced to a kind of training, the anal-
ogy between guardians and dogs begins to stink. The stench emanates not from 
the fragrant idea that women and men ought to be treated equally but from the 
fetid suggestion that education is conditioning. The second wave Socrates seeks 
to navigate renders the analogy yet more rank; for with it comes not simply the 
notion that women and children should be shared in common, but also that the 
guardians must be pure-bred like animals (457c–461e). Socrates here proposes to 
Glaucon, who, perhaps because he is both erotic and musical, is well versed in the 
breeding of noble animals, that the guardians will need to be bred in a manner 
much like he breeds his own hunting dogs (459a–466d).36
The scent of the dog has thus led us to the third, “biggest and most difficult 
[χαλεπώτατον]” wave—that philosophers should rule as kings (472a, 473e). In-
deed, already with the earlier suggestion that dogs were the most philosophical 
of animals, the trail had been established. That trail, however, is an upward road 
that does not end with the introduction of the philosopher king; rather, the ap-
peal to the philosopher king is articulated within a generally comic context in 
which human beings are understood in bestial terms. And yet, here, with the 
suggestion that the ruler must be erotic, we have already been moved beyond 
the image of the philosophical dog; for earlier, Socrates had emphasized the im-
portance of a love of learning, and of the need to learn—albeit perhaps by train-
ing—the difference between what is one’s own and what is hostile. Here, however, 
this love of learning is pushed further toward a love of the whole; for Socrates 
insists that love is not of a part but of the whole and that “a philosopher desires 
[ἐπιθυμεῖν] wisdom, not a part of it, but all of it” (475b). Thus, however comical 
the introduction of the philosopher king may be, it marks an important moment 
along a longer path toward a deeper understanding of what it is to live a philo-
sophical life. Indeed, if we reinscribe this discussion here back into Socrates’s 
original suggestion that we might discern something of the nature of justice in 
the soul by writing it large into the city, and if we recall that the entire discussion 
of dogs and wolves concerns the proper role of the thumotic dimension of the 
soul in relation to the logistic and a-logical aspects, we might pick up the scent 
of the philosophical life itself. That life, to be sure, requires more than a certain 
training concerning the friendly and the hostile; it involves more than breeding 
a community of noble animals by well-intentioned, calculative shepherds; it also 
requires some familiarity with what is proper and a desire to integrate a sense 
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of the good into the whole in which we together live. We thus catch something 
of the scent of the life to which Socrates calls Glaucon in the things said about 
philosophical dogs and kings.
Toward a Philosophical Life
The canine scent-markings we have thus far been following seem here to point 
to the central teachings of the dialogue and, indeed, even to territory that lies 
beyond the Republic itself along the longer road Socrates suggests that he and 
Glaucon would need to follow in order to discern the nature of justice. Socrates 
first mentions this longer road when he and Glaucon turn from their attempt to 
seek justice in the city to an attempt to locate it in the “single person” (434d–e).37 
Socrates points to the inadequacy of the road on which their current argument 
has progressed at precisely the moment they begin to consider the tripartite soul 
and the proper role spiritedness plays in orienting a person toward the Good. 
This too is the general context marked by the scent of wolves and dogs; for the 
image of noble dogs trained by caring shepherds seems to be the analogue of a 
well-bred soul whose spirited dimension has been properly trained to heed the 
commands of its logistical side. The longer road is, however, mentioned a second 
time in the dialogue, in Book 6, where the concern has become a proper philo-
sophical education. There Socrates rehearses with Adeimantus the path they have 
traversed, dividing the soul into three forms and seeking justice, moderation, 
courage, and wisdom; but he insists that a finer look at these things would require 
“another and longer road” (504a–b).38 The formulation suggests not simply that 
the course they have thus far traversed needs to be pursued yet further, but that 
there may be another road altogether that would afford “the finest possible” look 
at these things. There is, of course, controversy concerning the nature of this 
other, longer road, and, specifically, whether the road on which Socrates is com-
pelled by Glaucon to embark is the beginning of that longer road or a longer way 
down the path of an inadequate trail.39 Glaucon forces Socrates further down a 
path he is hesitant to take, a path that requires him to articulate the nature of the 
Good Itself and education in gymnastics, mathematics, and ultimately dialectic. 
Along this road Socrates is reticent to take, the scent of dogs is in the air, point-
ing in the direction of the longer road to which Socrates gestures. For in the final 
step of his account of the education that would be necessary for the guardians 
to become philosophers, Socrates comes to the highest study: dialectic. He de-
scribes how one engaged in dialectic attempts “by argument without the use of 
any of the senses—to attain each thing itself that is and doesn’t give up before he 
grasps by intellection itself that which is good itself” (532a–b). When Glaucon 
presses Socrates to proceed to the dialectic itself, which he describes as a “haven 
from the road,” Socrates refuses, insisting instead: “You will no longer be able to 
follow, my dear Glaucon . . . although there would not be any lack of eagerness 
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on my part. But you would no longer be seeing an image of what we are saying, 
but rather, the truth itself, at least as it looks to me. Whether it is really so or not 
can no longer be properly insisted upon. But that there is some such thing to see 
must be insisted on” (533a). Socrates denies Glaucon’s desire for a haven from 
the road only to redirect his thumotic energy toward the posited ideal of the 
Good. His insistence that there is such an ideal is rooted in his recognition that 
the Good Itself is “beyond being” and thus beyond even the power of the intel-
lect to discern. By positing the Good Itself as an erotic ideal, however, Socrates 
encourages Glaucon to orient his life toward the Good, and challenges him to 
weave this love of the Good into community with others (509b).40 That Glaucon 
might choose such a life was already suggested at the end of Socrates’s encounter 
with Thrasymachus, when he expressed a willingness to embrace the life of a just 
person as more profitable.
In giving Glaucon a taste of dialectic, Socrates treats him like a well-bred 
dog. Indeed, Socrates appeals twice at the end of Book 7 to the analogy between 
dogs and the children they have been educating in speech. First, in order to dis-
cern who might demonstrate a readiness for war, he suggests that children be led 
to war as spectators and permitted, when it is safe, to experience and “taste blood, 
like puppies” (537a). Second, however, Socrates warns that although a similar dy-
namic is at play with regard to speeches, they must take great care not to allow 
young people to be exposed too soon, for “when young boys get their first taste 
of them, they misuse them as though it were play, always using them to contra-
dict; and imitating those men by whom they are refuted, they themselves refute 
others, like puppies enjoying pulling and tearing with argument at those who 
happen to be near” (539b). Glaucon emerged from the encounter with the tamed 
wolf, Thrasymachus, as the readiest of the young men there present to receive a 
taste of dialectic; and when Socrates has finally made Glaucon eager for the path 
of dialectic itself, he transfers his desire for a haven from the road toward another, 
longer road: a life of questioning oriented by a concern for the good and a desire 
for justice.
If the scent of dogs in the Republic has led to the beginning of this longer 
road, the final appearance of the wolf in the dialogue reinforces the danger 
endemic to those who develop a taste for injustice and allow it to guide their 
lives. As he charts the transition from democratic leadership to tyrannical rule, 
Socrates appeals to the story of Lycaon. There he suggests that just as Lycaon 
was turned into a wolf the moment he tasted human innards mixed with other 
sacrificial victims, so too does the leader become a tyrant as soon as he sheds 
the blood of his tribe and acts unjustly against the citizens. After such injustices, 
Socrates suggests, such a man will either be killed by the people “or be a tyrant 
and turn from a human being into a wolf” (565d–566a). This last mark of the wolf 
in the dialogue evokes the memory of the first appearance of the “wolf itself,” Au-
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tolykos, that odious figure who turned Polemarchus away from his own misguid-
ed sense for the nature of justice and toward a friendship with Socrates that was 
inherited ultimately by Glaucon. The scent of dogs marks important moments of 
Glaucon’s developing friendship with Socrates, the philosopher, and points to a 
philosophical life oriented by a desire for the good and animated by the attempt 
to put justice into words. The scent-markings of the canines in the Republic seem 
thus to have led us to the longer road that charts a new territory beyond the text, 
toward a philosophical life in which a desire for the Good is permitted to inform 
our relationships with one another.
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